WHEN IT MATTERS MOST,
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TERM 2007 will be most remembered for a
few high-profile cases that dealt with issues of enormous legal and social significance: the meaning of the
Second Amendment,1 the right of individuals imprisoned in Guantanamo to have access to the federal courts,2 the ability of a state to impose the death penalty for the crime of child
rape.3 Not surprisingly, each of these cases was decided by a 5-4
margin with Justice Anthony Kennedy in the majority.
Simply put, on issues that are defined by ideology, the conservative position prevails in the Roberts Court except when Justice
Kennedy joins with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Occasionally this term, Justice Stevens or Justice Breyer joined with
the five most conservative Justices to create a 6-3 or 7-2 vote for a
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conservative result.4 But never did one of the four most conservative Justices – Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito – vote for a more liberal result in a case defined by ideology.5 The bottom line is that when the Court is divided 5-4 on issues where there are clear liberal and conservative positions, Justice
Kennedy is the swing vote.
This term, though, there were fewer cases defined by ideology
and fewer 5-4 decisions than in the first two years of the Roberts
Court. In October Term 2007, there were 14 decisions that were
resolved by a 5-4 or 5-3 margin, compared with 24 cases the year
before. There were more instances than in prior terms of the Roberts Court where criminal defendants and employees won important victories. I do not think that this indicates a shift in the ideology
of the Court or the Justices, but rather reflects what was on the
docket this year.
One other overall theme is important: in some key areas, the
Court rejected facial challenges to state laws, but left open the possibility of “as applied” challenges. For example, in Crawford v. Marion
County,6 the Court, without a majority opinion, upheld an Indiana
law for voter identification based on the record before it. Similarly,
in Baze v. Rees,7 the Court, again without a majority opinion, upheld
the three-drug protocol used for lethal injection based on the record before it. But in both cases, the Court’s rejection of a facial
challenge left open the possibility of a different result on a more
developed record. In each instance, the lack of a majority opinion
will confound lower courts as they deal with the almost certain future litigation.
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See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 128 S.Ct. 1520 (2008) (upholding the three-drug protocol
for death by lethal injection); Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 128
S.Ct. 1610 (2008) (upholding a state law requiring photo ID in order to vote).
There was one case in which Justice Alito did join with Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg: Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S.Ct. 1931
(2008), which held that federal employees may bring retaliation claims under the
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SECOND AMENDMENT

he case that understandably received the most media attention
was District of Columbia v. Heller, which concerned the constitutionality of a 32-year-old District of Columbia ordinance which
prohibited possession of handguns and imposed significant restrictions on long guns. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, invalidated the ordinance as violating the Second Amendment.
There long has been a debate about the meaning of the Second
Amendment, which provides: “A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” One side of the debate sees
the latter clause as being key and interprets the Second Amendment
as creating an individual right to possess firearms. The other side of
the debate emphasizes the first clause and says that it is a right only
for purposes of service in the militia.
The Court split 5-4 between these interpretations, choosing the
former, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority. He carefully
traced the history of gun rights, in England and the United States,
and said that the Second Amendment recognizes an individual’s
right to have firearms, especially in the home for the purpose of
self-defense. Justice Stevens, writing for the dissenters, also carefully looked at this history and came to the opposite conclusion,
arguing that the text and history of the Amendment make clear that
it protects a right to have firearms only for purposes of militia service.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion can be understood only through
an ideological prism. Conservatives long have favored gun rights
and Justice Scalia took this position, even though it required him to
abandon the conclusions that should have followed from his traditional methods of constitutional interpretation. The case thus powerfully demonstrates that Justice Scalia’s constitutional rulings, despite his professions to the contrary, ultimately are animated by his
conservative politics.
His opposition to abortion rights, his hostility to all forms of
race-conscious remedies, his desire to allow school prayer and aid
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to parochial schools, and his supporting of gun rights all come not
from a method of constitutional interpretation, but a conservative
political agenda. Unless one believes that the framers’ intent and
the contemporary Republican platform are identical, Justice Scalia’s
decisions cannot be seen as reflecting an originalist method of constitutional interpretation.
In fact, had Justice Scalia been true to his own interpretive philosophy, rather than his conservative politics, he would have had to
come to the opposite conclusion and find that the Second Amendment protects a right to possess firearms only for purposes of service in the militia. First, Justice Scalia repeatedly has emphasized
the importance of focusing on the text in interpreting legal documents.8 Justice Scalia could find an individual right to have guns
only by effectively ignoring the first half of the Second Amendment.
Yet, a cardinal rule of interpretation is that every clause of a provision must be given meaning. Justice Scalia interprets the Second
Amendment as if it said, “The right of the people to keep and bear
Arms shall not be infringed.” But that’s not what the provision says.
The only way to give meaning to both clauses is to conclude that the
Second Amendment protects a right to have firearms only for purposes of militia service.
Justice Scalia says that the first half of the Second Amendment is
the prefatory clause and the second half is the operative clause, and
that a prefatory clause never can negate an operative clause.9 But
that is circular. Both halves of the Second Amendment are “operative.” The first half negates the second only if one starts with the
conclusion that the Second Amendment protects a right to possess
weapons apart from militia service.
Second, Justice Scalia has said that if there is ambiguity in the
text, it is important to look to the original meaning at the time the
provision was adopted. James Madison drafted the Second Amendment, as he did all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. His initial
draft of the Second Amendment included a provision providing an
8
9

Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1997).
128 S.Ct. at 2788-89.
430

11 GREEN BAG 2D

Still the Kennedy Court
exemption from militia service for those who were conscientious
objectors. It provided: “The right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia
being the best security of a free country; but no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military
service in person.”10 The inclusion of this clause in the Second
Amendment strongly suggests that the provision was about militia
service.
Third, Justice Scalia could come to his conclusion only by abandoning stare decisis. Every prior Supreme Court decision interpreting the Second Amendment, and every federal court of appeals decision until a few years ago, had rejected the view that the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to have guns other than
for militia service.
In United States v. Miller,11 the Supreme Court declared that the
Second Amendment was limited to safeguarding possession of firearms for militia service. The Court upheld a federal law prohibiting
possession of sawed-off shotguns, explaining that they were not
weapons used in militia service at the time the Bill of Rights was
ratified. The Court was clear that it believed that the Second
Amendment was about protecting a right to have firearms for militia service:
With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration
and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It
must be interpreted and applied with that end in view. …
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears
from the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved
commentators.12

Fourth, in opinion after opinion, Justice Scalia has professed the
need to defer to elected officials and railed against judicial activism
10
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of Justices substituting their own views for those of legislatures.13
The District of Columbia law invalidated by the Court had been on
the books for 32 years. It was the product of a popularly elected
legislature.
But despite all of this, the conservatives on the Court found the
District of Columbia law unconstitutional. In doing so, they showed
that the conservative rhetoric about judicial restraint is a guise that
is used to oppose rights they don’t like. When it serves their political agenda, conservatives, such as Justice Scalia, are very much the
activists.
There is no doubt that this decision will lead to challenges to
countless federal, state, and local laws regulating firearms. Two
issues will be key in this litigation. First, what regulation of guns
will be allowed under what circumstances? Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion was clear that the Second Amendment does not create an
absolute right. He said, for example, that the government certainly
could regulate where guns would be allowed and could keep some
individuals (such as those with criminal records or histories of serious mental illness) from having firearms. However, the majority
opinion did not specify the level of scrutiny to be used. This will be
crucial as lower courts hear challenges to criminal and regulatory
statutes dealing with firearms.
Second, does the Second Amendment apply to state and local
governments? Never has the Second Amendment been found to
apply to other than the federal government and the Court did not
deal with this issue in Heller since a District of Columbia law was at
issue. Already challenges have been brought to gun control ordinances in San Francisco and Chicago, and the Supreme Court will
need soon to resolve this issue.

ENEMY COMBATANTS & ACCESS TO THE COURTS

I
13
14

n Boumediene v. Bush,14 the Supreme Court held that non-citizens
held as enemy combatants, including those imprisoned in Guan-

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
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tanamo, have the right to bring habeas corpus petitions in federal
court. Since the first detainees were brought to Guantanamo in
January 2002, the Bush administration has vehemently argued that
federal courts lack the authority to hear their habeas corpus petitions. After the Court rejected this argument in Rasul v. Bush,15
Congress adopted the Detainee Treatment Act and then the Military Commission Act to preclude such federal jurisdiction.
The Military Commission Act provides that non-citizens held as
enemy combatants shall not have access to federal courts via a writ
of habeas corpus or otherwise, except that if there is a military proceeding, the detainee may seek review of the outcome in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
In a 5-4 decision, with Justice Kennedy writing an opinion
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, the Court
held that the preclusion of habeas corpus jurisdiction was unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy explained that Article I, § 9 of the Constitution allows Congress to suspend habeas corpus in times of rebellion or invasion. Neither was claimed to be present. Moreover, the
Court concluded that the remedy provided, review in the D.C.
Circuit, did not substitute for habeas corpus.
The majority and the dissent articulated vastly different views
about the role of the federal courts during the war on terrorism.
For the majority, the Constitution – and access to the federal courts
to enforce it – are essential even in times of crisis. From this perspective, the decision was a profound reaffirmation of the rule of
law. For the dissent, the decision was dangerous judicial meddling
in a realm properly left to President and Congress. Justice Scalia
said he believed that people would needlessly die because of the
majority’s opinion.16
In the short term, the most important effect of the decision is to
allow hundreds of suits by Guantanamo detainees to go forward. I
15
16

542 U.S. 466 (2004).
Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The game of bait-and-switch that today’s
opinion plays upon the Nation’s Commander in Chief will make the war harder
on us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”).
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have been representing a Guantanamo detainee – Salem Gherebi –
for the last six years. He has been given no meaningful due process
of any sort. There is no foreseeable end to his detention. He is a
father of three who grew up in Libya, though he has never met his
third child. His wife was pregnant when he was apprehended in Afghanistan. Maybe he is a dangerous man who should be held; maybe
the government made a mistake and he should have been released
years ago. That is what due process is all about, making sure that
there is a neutral judge to determine whether a person should be
incarcerated.
Justice Scalia may be right that someone released could commit
terrorist acts. But every time a person is released from custody for
inadequate evidence, there is the chance that individual will commit
crimes and people will die. That, of course, never has been taken as
allowing indefinite detention without due process. Nor should it be
a basis for indefinite detention of enemy combatants without a semblance of due process.

C

CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE

riminal defendants fared better this year than in many recent
terms. There were two major death penalty cases, one of
which was a victory for those on death row. In Kennedy v. Louisiana,17 the Court held that the death penalty could not be imposed
for the crime of child rape. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court
in a 5-4 decision, held that a person may be sentenced to death only
for the intentional killing of another.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion said once more that the determination of what is cruel and unusual punishment is based on
“evolving standards of decency.” He noted that only six states allow
the death penalty for child rape and none have executed a person
for the crime in the last several decades. He said that the goals of
the death penalty, in terms of deterrence and retribution, would
not be served by allowing such executions.
17
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It is notable that this is the same majority that held a few years
ago in Roper v. Simmons that the death penalty cannot be imposed for
crimes committed by children.18 It seems clear that these five Justices – Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer – will prevent expansion of the death penalty and will limit its use. This, of
course, could change dramatically if any of them are replaced by
individuals with views like those of the four dissenters.
In Baze v. Rees,19 the Court upheld the three-drug protocol used
for lethal injections in most states that have capital punishment. The
decision was 7-2, though there was no majority opinion. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality, held that to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, a method of execution must present a
“substantial” or “objectively intolerable” risk of unnecessary suffering. The Court said that a state’s refusal to adopt an alternative procedure is unconstitutional only where the procedure is feasible,
readily implemented, and significantly reduces the risk of substantial pain. Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment and
said that the method of execution does not violate the Constitution.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and expressed reservations about the three-drug protocol, saying that it would not be allowed in veterinary medicine, and questioned whether the death
penalty ever can be constitutionally administered. Surprisingly, he
nonetheless voted with the majority based on precedent and the
record before the Court.
The decision was based on the record before the Court concerning the risks from Kentucky’s method of execution. The door remains open to challenges to lethal injection based on more developed records that show a substantial or objectively intolerable risk
of harm from the drugs used for lethal injections.
From the perspective of day-to-day practice in federal courts,
two decisions early in the term concerning criminal sentencing
were among the most important. In Gall v. United States,20 the Court
18
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held that (a) federal courts of appeals are to review sentences under
an abuse of discretion standard, and (b) district courts must justify
deviations to facilitate appellate review, but there need not be extraordinary circumstances to justify sentences outside the ranges
provided under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. In Kimbrough v.
United States,21 the Court applied this to hold that district courts
may use their discretion in sentencing to alleviate the substantial
disparity in sentencing for crack as opposed to powder cocaine. Together, these cases show that the Court’s decision in United States v.
Booker,22 is enormously important in its holding that the federal Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, and courts of appeals should uphold sentences so long as they are reasonable.
Kimbrough is likely to be especially important in empowering district
courts to alleviate the terribly unjust disparities that exist between
crack and powder cocaine sentences.
One other criminal procedure case is quite important. In Giles v.
California,23 the Court held that a criminal defendant does not “forfeit” his or her Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights upon
a showing that the defendant caused the unavailability of a witness.
Four years ago, in Crawford v. Washington,24 the Court held that a
prosecutor may not use testimonial statements against a criminal
defendant if the witness is unavailable at trial and the statements are
reliable. The issue in Giles was whether there is an exception to
Crawford in a situation where the defendant killed the witness and
thus caused the person’s unavailability to testify.
Justice Scalia wrote for the Court and found in favor of the
criminal defendant. The Court said that there must be more than a
showing that the defendant’s actions are responsible for the unavailability of the witness; there also must be a showing that the defendant’s actions were undertaken for the purpose of preventing the
witness from testifying. This is a case likely to have significant im21
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plications in domestic violence and child abuse cases. These are the
areas where often witnesses are least likely to be available to testify
at trial, as the facts of Giles illustrate. Limiting the use of statements
by the victim often will make convictions difficult, if not impossible.
Together, these cases show that in some areas of criminal procedure – especially sentencing and the Confrontation Clauses – ideology does not predict outcomes. The conservatives on the Court,
such as Justice Scalia, have taken the lead in these areas in expanding
the rights of criminal defendants.

I

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

t also was a surprisingly good year for employees in employment
discrimination litigation. In two cases, CBOCS West Inc. v.
Humphries,25 and Gomez-Perez v. Potter,26 the Court made clear that
laws prohibiting employment discrimination include a claim for
retaliation, even if that is not provided in the statutes, unless Congress expressly specifies otherwise. In CBOCS, the Court held that
42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in contracting, includes a cause of action for those alleging retaliation based on
race. Similarly, in Gomez-Perez, the Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act protects federal employees from
retaliation, even though the statute expressly provides this only for
employees in the private sector.
In Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory,27 the Court held that
an employer defending a disparate impact claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act bears both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion for showing that the decision was
based on “reasonable factors other than age.” This is an important
victory for plaintiffs in age discrimination suits.

25
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BUSINESS LITIGATION

verall, the Roberts Court is quite pro-business and that was
reflected in a number of its decisions. I think that it is the
most pro-business Court since the mid-1930s. For example, in
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,28 the Court ruled in favor of manufacturers
of medical devices and held that approval by the Food and Drug
Administration under the Medical Devices Act preempts state tort
and breach of warranty claims. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court
in an 8-1 decision, concluded that a provision in the Act preempting
state regulation of devices approved by the federal government also
preempts states from allowing liability. Justice Ginsburg was alone
in dissent in arguing that the statute preempts only regulation and
not liability and that the Court should follow the traditional presumption against preemption.
In Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,29 the
Court held that § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
SEC Rule 10b-5 do not allow a plaintiff class of investors to maintain a civil cause of action against vendors who participated in a
scheme to inflate a public corporation’s stock price where the vendors made no public statements upon which the plaintiffs relied.
This ruling, by a 5-3 margin, is an important win for businesses in
limiting their liability under federal securities law.
Once more, the Court limited punitive damages, though this
time on very narrow grounds in a case of great significance. What is
most important about the Court’s recent decision in Exxon Shipping
Company v. Baker is that it is just about punitive damages in maritime
cases.30 The Court was clear and emphatic that it was not relying on
the Constitution and, in fact, it denied certiorari on Exxon’s constitutional challenge to the punitive damage award against it.
The case arose from the tragic oil spill on March 24, 1989, when
the Exxon supertanker Valdez grounded on Bligh Reef off the Alas28
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kan coast, fracturing its hull and spilling millions of gallons of crude
oil into Prince William Sound. The tanker was over 900 feet long
and was used by Exxon to carry crude oil from the end of the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline in Valdez, Alaska, to the lower 48 states. On
the night of the spill it was carrying 53 million gallons of crude oil,
or over a million barrels. The case before the Court was an action
brought by commercial fishermen, native Alaskans, and individuals
dependent on Prince William Sound for their livelihoods for the
devastating economic losses they suffered.
The accident was the result of the drunkenness and errors of the
captain, Joseph Hazelwood. The federal court jury awarded $5 billion in punitive damages against Exxon. The case was twice remanded by the Ninth Circuit in light of Supreme Court decisions
concerning constitutional limits on punitive damages. Ultimately
the Court of Appeals approved a $2.5 billion punitive damages
award.
The Supreme Court said that it was ruling only on the scope of
punitive damages in the narrow context of maritime cases. However, Justice Souter’s reasoning was less about maritime law and
more about the need for predictable and consistent rules for punitive damages awards. Justice Souter said that the solution for this is
to limit punitive damages to a one-to-one ratio with compensatory
damages:
Accordingly, given the need to protect against the possibility (and the disruptive cost to the legal system) of awards
that are unpredictable and unnecessary, either for deterrence or for measured retribution, we consider that a 1:1
ratio, which is above the median award, is a fair upper limit
in such maritime cases.31

Since this is based entirely on the Court’s power to fashion federal
common law, Justice Souter noted that Congress could overturn it.
The one-to-one ratio caused the Court to lower the punitive damages from $2.5 billion to $507 million. This reasoning could apply
31

Id. at 2633.
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in other areas of federal common law where punitive damages are
awarded. But this is a relatively narrow category of cases and the
decision should have no impact outside of these areas.

I

VOTING RIGHTS

n Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,32 the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a requirement for photo identification in order for a person to vote. There was no majority opinion for the Court as there was a 3-3-3 split among the Justices, with
six voting to allow the regulation.
Justice Stevens wrote for two other Justices – Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Kennedy. He said that in evaluating laws regulating the election process, courts should engage in a balancing test,
weighing the justification for the state’s rule against the burdens on
voters. He said that Indiana’s requirement for photo identification
served important purposes: deterring and detecting voter fraud and
enhancing voter confidence in the electoral system. On the other
side of the balance, he said that the burden on voters was minimal.
He stressed that on the record before the Court, there was no evidence that the Indiana law kept people from voting. He explained
that it is relatively easy to get photo identification and those without
it can cast a provisional ballot and then verify their identity at their
county seat within a short time after the election.
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment and was joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. He said that Justice Stevens’s opinion did
not pay enough deference to state electoral processes and that state
laws regulating the electoral process should be invalidated only if
they have a “severe” impact on the right to vote. He advocated the
“application of a deferential ‘important regulatory interests’ standard for nonsevere, nondiscriminatory restrictions, reserving strict
scrutiny for laws that severely restrict the right to vote.”33
Justice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer. He said that by the district court’s estimate,
32
33

128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008).
Id. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
440

11 GREEN BAG 2D

Still the Kennedy Court
one percent of Indiana voters, primarily poorer voters and voters of
color, would be kept from casting ballots. He estimated this at
43,000 and detailed the obstacles to receiving photo identification
and casting provisional ballots. On the other side of the balance he
said that Indiana produced no evidence of a voter fraud problem of
the sort that photo identification would solve.
The decision is very troubling. Previously, the Court had ruled
that laws which keep some citizens from voting must meet strict
scrutiny. For example, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,34 the
Court used strict scrutiny and held that a $1.50 poll tax is unconstitutional, even though it would keep only a small number of voters
from casting ballots. Nor is there a tradition of deference to states
when there are restrictions on the right to vote. It is impossible to
reconcile Justice Scalia’s deferential approach in Crawford with his
vote, and the Court’s decision, in Bush v. Gore.35
Such deference seems particularly inappropriate when a law is
clearly motivated by partisan politics. All of the Republicans in the
Indiana legislature voted for the law and all of the Democrats
against it. This was not coincidence, as the law has a far greater
harmful impact on Democrats than Republicans.
Moreover, the Court’s aversion to allowing a facial challenge
means that a law like this must go into effect and disenfranchise voters at an election in order to be challenged. Justice Stevens’s majority opinion stressed the lack of proof that individuals were kept
from voting. There certainly is the possibility of future challenges to
such laws if there is proof that they keep a significant number of
people from voting.

A

CONCLUSION

s I write in July 2008, the November presidential election
looms. What is it likely to mean for the future of constitutional law? In all likelihood, it will produce a Court that is ideologically the same as the past term or is more conservative. A more lib34
35
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eral Court is unlikely. The vacancies between January 20, 2009 and
January 20, 2013 are likely to come from one side of the political
aisle. Justice Stevens turned 88 in April of this year and it seems
unlikely that he will be on the Court in 2013, the year he turns 93.
There are always rumors that Justice Ginsburg might retire and that
Justice Souter wants to go home to New Hampshire.
By contrast, John Roberts is 54 years old. If he remains Chief
Justice until he is 88, he will be Chief Justice until 2042. Clarence
Thomas and Samuel Alito have yet to turn 60. Both Antonin Scalia
and Anthony Kennedy turn 72 this year.
Thus, the five conservative Justices are likely, absent unforeseen
events, to remain another decade. If it is President McCain replacing Stevens or Souter or Ginsburg, the Court surely will become
more conservative. If it is President Obama, the Court will likely
stay the same as it is now – a Court where when it matters most, it
is the Anthony Kennedy Court.
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